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PREFACE 
This report is one of a series describing IIASA research into methods 
for comparing alter~iative lrlodels that could be applied for the establish- 
ment of control policies to meet water quality standards. In addition to 
model evaluation, this project has focused on problems of optimization and 
conflict resolution in large river basins. 

ABSTRACT 
Economists have frequently proposed the use of taxes to internalize 
externalities, the unit tax on a particular activity being equal to the marginal 
social damage it generates. This paper introduces such a taxation scheme, 
comprising a set of rules which, given a set of polluters, their profits and 
costs. and a Central Authority for environmental control, generates a set 
of taxes to  be levied on the waste emissions. Different attributes of 
the taxation schemes are then presented, the most important of which 
(stability) refers to the possibility of overall cooperation between all the 
polluters. The paper concludes by examining the implications of the exis- 
tence of stable taxation schemes and of the imposition of constraints either 
on the emissions or on the percentage of load removed. 

Stable Taxation Schemes in Regional 
Environmental Management 
INTRODUCTION 
Many opportunities and problems faced by individual decision 
units can be better dealt with or exploited by group behavior. 
One example that this paper is concerned with is the problem of 
dealing with water pollution, and the opportunity presented is 
for a joint arrangement to treat and transport wastes. Regional 
or areawide wastewater treatment systems offer economic and en- 
vironmental benefits to wastewater dischargers. Economic bene- 
fits arise from economies of scale and the opportunity to devel- 
op a comprehensive, consistent wastewater treatment system which 
minimizes redundant capacities. Environmental benefits arise 
from the increased reliability of larger, better funded systems 
and the opportunity to move effluents to discharge points with 
minimal adverse impact. 
Along with the potential benefits come the problems of how 
to organize the regional system efficiently including an agree- 
ment on how the benefits should be distributed. One mechanism 
for allocating benefits is through a pricing structure based on 
the services of a regional authority. Depending on the particular 
pricing structure and the administrative control exercised by a 
central coordinating agency, different distributions of profits 
and benefits result. Certain pricing rules may unduly favor one 
class of users over another. 
A central problem for the investigation is the question of 
what allocation of benefits among the participants reinforces 
group adhesion. We refer to a pricing rule as stable if once 
stated there are no incentives for the users of the service to 
reject the regional plan. Such an incentive to reject would 
exist if a smaller group of participants could conceive of a plan 
that would allow for greater rewards. The desirability of cen- 
tral treatment of water depends on the existence of economies of 
scale. Given that there are economies of scale over the relevant 
range of demand, the potential for a profitable collaboration 
among users exists. The options for choosing stable prices de- 
pends on the degree of economies of scale. 
In presenting the model of a regional system, we consider 
two possible institutional arrangements. Either the waste treat- 
ment plants could be owned and operated by the producer, or they 
could be operated by a regional authority. The general setting 
involves a transfer from the producers in the region and the 
regional authority. The transfer consists of waste discharge, 
possibly treated, and funds from the producer to the regional 
authority. The amount of waste discharge to be transferred to 
the regional authority and the decision on any further treatment 
is based on achieving the greatest regional profit, where profit 
is measured by private gains by firms in terms of their own out- 
puts, and both the environmental damages and treatment costs. It 
should be emphasized that a best regional plan does not necessarily 
imply one central treatment plant but may consist of a completely 
decentralized system of treatment plants, one for each discharger. 
The main point is that the plan developed should take into account 
the total costs and profits for the entire region. Associated 
with a regional solution will be a set of charges paid by the 
firms to the regional system. The charges are both for the treat- 
ment of waste that the regional authority carries out (if any) and 
for the environmental damages. The charges have a variety of pur- 
poses; first, they are incentives to the firms to develop produc- 
tion processes which generate less waste discharge; secondly, they 
are used by the regional authority to pay for the costs of dis- 
posing of the waste including compensation for environmental dam- 
ages; and last, the charges should support the regional system. 
In order to understand and analyze the problem of supporting 
financially a regional system based on overall planning, we will 
use some of the concepts from the theory of games, and in particu- 
lar the characteristic function. In order to explain the meaning 
and use of this function, consider a regional system consisting 
of N firms plus the regional authority. One way of describing a 
game is to determine what each collection or coalition of players 
can achieve. The characteristic function of a coalition is such 
a measure, for it gives to each coalition what that coalition's 
total profit is worth. For the regional problem, the character- 
istic function determines the maximum net profit attainable for 
any group of firms and the regional authority. In order to 
specify the function, we must define what the legal conditions 
governing the formation of a regional system are. For example, 
without any legal restrictions on direct discharge by a producer, 
there would be no rationale for any regional system. The legal 
imposition of restrictions on effluent discharge creates a possible 
need on the part of the dischargers for some coordination of waste 
treatment in order to achieve economies of scale. From the view- 
point of the regional authority, it must receive some guidance 
from the governing political unit on how discharges should be 
determined. Thus the method for calculating the values of the 
characteristic function must reflect the legal restrictions on the 
choices available to the participants. 
We shall assume that the regional authority has been given 
legal responsibility for all discharges. Based on a damage func- 
tion, it must make appropriate payments for compensation. Dis- 
chargers must obtain an agreement with the regional authority for 
a certain discharge level. Without an agreement, no discharge is 
possible. Reflecting these conditions, the characteristic func- 
tion is defined to have the following properties. First, the 
value of a coalition without the regional authority as a member 
is zero, since we assume that some waste discharge is generated 
at any level of production and discharge rights must be granted 
by the regional authority. Secondly, a coalition with only the 
Central Agency as a member will have zero value since there is no 
discharge taking place. Thus the only coalitions with potentially 
positive value for the characteristic function are those that con- 
tain both the regional authority and at least one producer. 
In summary, the characteristic function V is defined with 
respect to different collections of dischargers and the regional 
3uthority. The value of the function gives the total potential 
3rofit available including taking account of treatment costs and 
2nvironmental damage. Because of the legal restrictions, zero 
~alue is given to coalitions that do not include the regional 
3uthority. 
Changes in the characteristic function V indicate how profit 
depends on the coalition structure. Thus consider yl and y 2 
iistinct collections of all parties N (dischargers and Central 
iuthority) where the Central Authority is a member of, say, Y1' 
Then V(y2) = 0 and V(y,) 2 0. Suppose V(yl) I V(yl u yZ). In 
that case, the addition of the members of y2 to the group con- 
sisting of yl improves the total profit. In the case we are 
nodelling, a regional authority controlling pollution discharge, 
this would mean that the increase in environmental damage and 
treatment costs is less than the additional profit made by y2. 
The reverse condition, V(yl) > V(yl u y2), reflects a situation 
 here the additional members from y2 lower the total profits. 
,Jnder this circumstance, the environmental damages and treatment 
zosts are extremely high. One would expect strong resistance to 
having the additional members added to the region. 
A major issue explored in the paper is the existence of 
charges on the dischargers which allows the regional authority 
to at least cover its costs while at the same time, there is no 
incentive for any group of dischargers to withdraw from the re- 
gional system. In our formulation of the problem, the regional 
authority has certain extraordinary power in that a discharger 
zannot operate without securing some agreement with the authority. 
Under this assumption, as already mentioned, a virtual veto power 
is possessed by the regional authority. As long as certain condi- 
tions on the profit functions for the firms are satisfied, then 
globally stable arrangements for charging the dischargers exist 
as long as V(G) 2 V(y) for all coalitions y. In fact, if globally 
stable charges do exist, the value of the grand coalition must 
save this property. In general terms, the satisfaction of this 
condition means that overall cooperation is profitable. From a 
total profit point of view, joint cooperation in regional plan- 
ning among all dischargers is better than having any smaller group 
operating in the river basin. Thus, what is best from the opti- 
mality point of view can also be achieved via a globally stable 
pricing system. 
The benefits accruing to each party are the net profits after 
a taxation charge has been levied by the Central Authority. A 
taxation scheme is acceptable if each coalition member will get 
a non-negative benefit; it is efficient if the total benefits of 
any coalition sum to its characteristic function value. Taxation 
schemes that are both stable and efficient will necessarily be 
acceptable. Examples that have the above properties and will be 
described in subsequent sections include: equal amount of bene- 
fit per polluter, lexicographic, generalized lexicographic, and 
a method based on the Shapley value. 
The benefit accruing to the Central Authority is the summed 
charges over polluters minus the costs for environmental damage 
(and in some cases, treatment costs). Environmental damage costs 
are convex in the effluents; that is, they satisfy the congestion 
effect. Thus, the existence of these costs represents a counter- 
balancing force to the formation of the grand coalition N. If 
these costs did not occur, then there would exist stable and effi- 
cient taxation schemes, and it would be possible for the Central 
Authority to be nonprofit making. However, if the variation in 
the damage costs is appropriately large, then no stable and ef- 
ficient taxation schemes with zero benefit to the Central Authority 
can exist. The paper concludes by examining the implications on 
the solution of the game when there is an imposition of constraints 
on the emission or treatment of effluents by the polluters. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
The Parties 
We will, in general, make reference to the scheme of Figure 1 
where the first block represents the pollution units called firms 
F I R M S  t NETWORK ENVIRONMENT 
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Figure 1 .  Structure of the system. 
and the second and third blocks are the n e t w o r k  o f  t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t s  
and the e n v i r o n m e n t  (e.g. river basin, lake, sea,...). The vari- 
able Qi (i = 1,. . . ,m) represents the mass flow rate of pollutant 
from firm i to the network of treatment plants while the variable 
q.(j = 1, ...,p ) represents the mass flow rate of pollutant dis- 
I 
charged by the jth effluent of the network into the environment. 
Each firm i is characterized by a p r o f i t  Di(Qi) , i.e. the 
profit for producing an amount of good which corresponds to a 
production Qi of pollutant. 
The network of treatment plants is characterized by a c o s t  T 
which is, in general, a function of the input and output vectors 
Q = (Q,. . .Qm) and q = (ql.. .qp), i.e. 
Given a class of networks (i.e. given the structure of the net- 
work) we assume that the cost T is the one corresponding to the 
least cost solution, i.e. Equation (1) represents the cost of the 
cheapest network in the class. For example, if the structure of 
the network is the one described in Figure 2a (completely disag- 
gregated network: one firm - one plant - one effluent) then 
where Ti(Qi,qi) is the cost of the cheapest treatment plant which 
transforms Qi into qi. In this particular case the cost of the 
network is the sum of the single costs of the treatment plants. 
Figure 2. T w o  particular structures of the treatment network (each circle 
represents a wastewater treatment plant). 
(a) completely disaggregated network 
(b) partially disaggregated network. 
On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  no r e s t r i c t i o n  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
t h e  ne twork ,  T  o n l y  depends  upon t h e  t o t a l  i n p u t  and t h e  t o t a l  
o u t p u t ,  i . e .  
The t h i r d  component o f  o u r  sys tem,  t h e  env i ronment ,  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  f u n c t i o n  
which i s  t h e  sum, i n  monetary t e r m s ,  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  damages  
t o  s o c i e t y  ( h e a l t h ,  v e g e t a t i o n ,  g o o d s , . . . ) .  
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  we w i l l  assume t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  u n i t  
c a l l e d  C e n t r a l  ~ u t h o r i t y  (C.A.) which,  depend ing  upon t h e  c a s e s ,  
w i l l  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  network and t h e  env i ronment  o r  t h e  
env i ronment  a l o n e  ( s e e  F i g u r e  3 ) .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e  ( s e e  F i g u r e  
3a )  t h e  C.A. i s  t a k i n g  c a r e  o f  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  network 
and w i l l  c h a r g e  e a c h  f i r m  i depend ing  upon t h e  amount Qi of  
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Figure 3.  'The unified representation 
(a) charges on 0; 
( t ~ )  c,hargrs o n  q . J 
p o l l u t a n t  p roduced ,  w h i l e  i n  t h e  second c a s e  (see F i g u r e  3b)  
t h e  c h a r g e  is  on t h e  o u t p u t  q  of  t h e  network of  t r e a t m e n t  j 
p l a n t s .  These  two c a s e s  c a n  be f o r m a l l y  d e s c r i b e d  a s  a  un ique  
c a s e  ( s e e  F i g u r e  4 )  where t h e  u n i t s  c o n s t i t u t i n g  t h e  f i r s t  com- 
p o n e n t  o f  t h e  sys tem a r e  c a l l e d  poZZuters and a r e  supposed t o  
P O L L U T E R S  C E N T R A L  
AUTHORITY  
F i p r c  4. Compact structure of the system. 
be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  demand function Ai(xi) ( i  = 1 , .  . . , n )  w h i l e  
t h e  second component i s  t h e  C e n t r a l  A u t h o r i t y  which i s  c h a r a c -  
t e r i z e d  by  a cost function C ( x )  where x  s t a n d s  f o r  ( x l , .  . . ,x,).  
For  example ,  i f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h e  one r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  F i g u r e  
3a the polluters can be identified with the firms (xi = Qi) and 
the demand and cost functions are 
~ ( x )  = min [T(x,q) + E(q)l - 
q 
On the other hand, if the charge is on the output of the treat- 
ment network (i.e. x = qi) and the network is completely dis- i 
aggregated as in Figure 2a, we have 
A. (x.) = max [D. (Q. - Ti(Qirxi) I 
1 1  1 1  
Qi 
while when groups y. of firms jointly take care of their waste 
and discharge qi, (i.e. the treatment network is only partially 
disaggregated as shown in Figure 2b), the demand functions are 
defined for each group yi as 
In more complex situations the variable xi must be defined as 
a subvector of q and charges must be imposed on these subvectors. 
For the sake of simplicity in the following we will make refer- 
ence only to the case in which xi is scalar, even if the theory 
presented in this paper can be developed for the general case. 
From now on the set of polluters is called N, i.e. 
while by 
we denote the set of all parties (polluters and C.A.). Con- 
sistently, if y is a subset of the parties, then y is the union 
of this subset and the C.A. i.e. 
while 2 is the set obtained by eliminating the C.A. from y, 
i.e. 
Notice that y c y c y and either y = y or y = y. Moreover, given 
- -  - - 
a set y of polluters we denote by xY the vector {xi} with i E y 
and for the sake of simplicity in notation we define the vector 
xY also for sets y containing the C.A. as xY = xg. 
We can now define the aggregated demand function A (xY) for 
Y 
any set y of polluters as 
while for sets y containing the C.A. we write 
since the C.A. is not characterized by any demand function. Simi- 
larly, given a set y of polluters we define the cost C (xY) as the 
Y 
cost characterizing the C.A. in the case in which only the pol- 
luters of the set y are present in the system, i.e. 
and again we write C (xY) instead of C (x?) in the case in which 
Y Y 
y contains the C.A. 
The Characteristic Function 
Given a system (i.e. a set N of polluters, their demand func- 
tions, a Central Authority, and its cost function) we are inter- 
ested in the maximum net profit attainable by any subset y of the 
parties. This net profit, denoted by V(y) is the so-called char- 
- 
acteristic function and is defined on all subsets y of ;i as follows 
where A (xY) and C (xY) are defined as in Equations (2) and ( 3 ) .  
Y Y 
In the following xY will denote that particular vector which 
solves the optimization problem (4). The assumption of zero net 
profit for all subsets of polluters (y = y)  represents the fact 
that polluters are not obliged to participate in the system but 
at the same time cannot enter the system without making an agree- 
ment with the C.A. 
The reader accustomed to game theory must notice that we do 
not a priori assume that the characteristic function V is super- 
additive (V(f) + V(7) I V(.? U y) for all sets and L, of polluters 
such that 5 n L, = 8 )  as usually done in game theory (note the dif- 
ference between x and x). Superadditivity can be a priori in- 
ferred only if the option always exists for groups to act sepa- 
rately if their joint action would not lead to an improvement of 
their total profit. However in environmental pollution problems 
this option never exists, since the environmental damage can never 
be decomposed into the sum of individual damages each attributable 
to a given group. 
An important attribute of characteristic functions is that 
of convexity. 
Definition 1 ( C o n v e x i t y  o f  v) 
A characteristic function is convex if 
for all x  c - y  c _ f i  and for all i Efi - y .  
The Taxation Scheme 
The charge on xi is denoted by Ci(xi) and will often be 
referred to as t a x  in what follows. When the ith polluter is 
charged an amount Ci(xi) his b e n e f i t  is given by 
Bi(xi) = A. 1 1  (x.) - C .  (x.) i E N  1 1  ( 6 )  
while the benefit accruing to the C.A. is 
We assume that each polluter is p r o f i t  m a x i m i z i n g  in the sense 
that he selects his discharge XI by maximizing Equation (6) i.e. 
Then the corresponding benefit for the C.A. is given by 
We are now in the position to formally define a taxation scheme. 
Definition 2 ( T a x a t i o n  s cheme)  
A taxation scheme is a set of rules that, given a system, gener- 
ates a set of taxes Ci(*) ,i E N. 
Some examples of taxation schemes may clarify this definition. 
E X A M P L E  1 
The f o l l o w i n g  two r u l e s  d e f i n e  a  t a x a t i o n  scheme. 
1 . Compute V ( R )  and  xiR. 
2.  De te rmine  C. ( .  ) i E N s o  t h a t  
* I - a  (i i)  B . = -  V ( W )  0 5 CY 5 1 i € ~  . 
n  
C o n d i t i o n  ( i )  means t h a t  t h e  t a x e s  a r e  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  p o l l u t e r s  
by  s o l v i n g  t h e i r  own p rob lems  w i l l  maximize  t h e  t o t a l  ( s o c i a l )  
b e n e f i t  s i n c e  ( i )  i m p l i e s  
C o n d i t i o n  (i i)  means t h a t  t h e  p o l l u t e r s  d i v i d e  e q u a l l y  p a r t  o f  
t h e  t o t a l  b e n e f i t .  h loreover ,  i f  a = 0 t h e r e  i s  n o  b e n e f i t  f o r  
t h e  C.A.,  w h i l e  i f  a = 1 t h e r e  i s  no  b e n e f i t  f o r  t h e  p o l l u t e r s .  
Remark 1 
R u l e  2  above  makes s e n s e  o n l y  i f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  C . ( . )  s a t i s f y i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s  ( i )  a n d  (ii) c a n  a c t u a l l y  b e  f o u n d .  O b v i o u s l y  i f  t h e  
demand f u n c t i o n s  A. ( a )  a r e  c o n c a v e  t h e n  s u c h  f u n c t i o n s  C .  ( - )  e x i s t  
a n d  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
The f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  means t h a t  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c h a r g e  e q u a l s  t h e  
m a r g i n a l  demand and  i m p l i e s  p r o p o s i t i o n  2 ( i ) .  The second  con-  
d i t i o n  wh ich  f o l l o w s  f rom E q u a t i o n  ( 6 ) ,  l e a d s  t o  p r o p o s i t i o n  2 ( i i ) .  
The f u n c t i o n s  C i ( - )  may n o t  b e  e v e r y w h e r e  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  a s  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  b u l k  o r  t w o - p a r t  t a r i f f s .  However, f o r  o u r  p u r p o s e  it is  
W 
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  assume t h a t  C i ( - )  i s  l o c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  a t  x i .  
EXAMPLE 2 ( L e x i c o g r a p h i c  t a x a t i o n  scheme) 
The f o l l o w i n g  two r u l e s  d e f i n e  a  t a x a t i o n  scheme. 
1 .  Given an  o r d e r i n g  i + o  ( i)  i n  compute 
v ( x k )  f o r  xk = { i :  w ( i )  2 k) k  = 0 , 1 , 2  ,..., n  
( n o t e  t h a t  t h e  computa t ion  o f  t h e  l a s t  t e r m  V(xn)  g i v e s  t h e  v e c t o r  
X 
P I .  
2. Determine C i  ( ' )  i E N s o  t h a t  
* R (i) xi  = x i i € N  
A s  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  example we have 1 B: = ~ ( n )  ( t h i s  f o l l o w s  f rom 
- 
N 
( i )  ) . The s e n s e  o f  c o n d i t i o n  ( i i )  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :  a  p o l l u t e r  g e t s  
a  b e n e f i t  e q u a l  t o  t h e  improvement h e  g e n e r a t e s  i n  t h e  t o t a l  bene- 
f i t  when he e n t e r s  t h e  sys tem f o l l o w i n g  t h e  o r d e r  w .  I f  w(0) = 0  
t h e  C . A .  h a s  no b e n e f i t  w h i l e  i f  w(0)  = n  we have t h e  same scheme 
of  Example 1  w i t h  a = 1.  
EXAMPLE 3 (GeneraZized t a x a t i o n  scheme) .  
The f o l l o w i n g  two r u l e s  d e f i n e  a  t a x a t i o n  scheme. 
1 .  A s  i n  r u l e  1  o f  Example 2 ,  b u t  f o r  a l l  o r d e r i n g s  w . ( . ) ,  
I 
j = 1 , 2 , . . . ,  ( n + l ) !  
2 .  Determine C .  ( .) i € N s o  t h a t  
1 
* 
Again  we have  1Bi = v(N) . C o n d i t i o n  (ii) s a y s  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  
- 
N 
o f  t h e  i t h  p o l l u t e r  a r e  a  convex c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  
o b t a i n e d  by means o f  a l l  l e x i c o g r a p h i c  t a x a t i o n  schemes.  
EXAMPLE 4 ( S h a p l e y  t a x a t i o n  s c h e m e )  
T h i s  scheme is  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  o f  Example 3. I n  f a c t  it c o r -  
r e s p o n d s  t o  l e t t i n g  
i n  c o n d i t i o n  ( i i ) .  
Each example  shows t h a t  a  t a x a t i o n  scheme g e n e r a t e s  d i f f e r -  
* 
e n t  t a x e s  C i ( - )  and d i f f e r e n t  b e n e f i t s  - Bi  when a p p l i e d  t o  d i f f e r -  
e n t  s y s t e m s .  For  t h i s  r e a s o n  BL' i E ij w i l l  i n d i c a t e  t h e  b e n e f i t  
i '  
a c c r u i n g  t o  t h e  i t h  p a r t y  when t h e  set  o f  p o l l u t e r s  i n  t h e  s y s t e m  
i s  y .  Moreover ,  we d e f i n e  B$ = 0, i E y s i n c e  t h e  p o l l u t e r s  a l o n e  
1 - 
c a n n o t  have  p r o f i t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ,  g i v e n  a  s e t  
- 
- Y y c  N ,  e i t h e r  B Y  = B Y  i f  y  = y, o r  B? = BT = 0 i f  y = 3 .  
A t t r i b u t e s  o f  T a x a t i o n  Schemes 
As m e n t i o n e d  i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t h r e e  f u n d a m e n t a l  a t t r i b u t e s  
c a n  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t a x a t i o n  schemes ,  namely a c c r p t n b i l l t y ,  e f f i -  
c i e n c y  and  s t a b i 2 i t y .  
The a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  a  t a x a t i o n  scheme c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  a l l  p a r t i e s  a r e  n o n - n e g a t i v e .  More 
p r e c i s e l y ,  we h a v e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e f i n i t i o n .  
D e f i n i t i o n  3 ( A c c e p t a b i l i t y )  
A  t a x a t i o n  scheme i s  a c c e p t a b l e ,  f o r  t h e  s e t  N ,  i f  t h e  c o r r e s p o n -  
- - 
d i n g  v e c t o r  of  b e n e f i t s  B~ = (BN SN 
--
BN) i s  n o n - n e g a t i v e ,  
oL1 -n  
i . e .  
The n o t i o n  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n .  I n  s h o r t ,  a  t a x a t i o n  scheme i s  s a i d  t o  
b e  e f f i c i e n t  when t h e  s o l u t i o n  it g e n e r a t e s  ( t h r o u g h  t h e  p r o f i t  
maximiza t ion  o f  t h e  p o l l u t e r s )  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  maximum 
t o t a l  b e n e f i t .  
D e f i n i t i o n  4 (Efficiency) 
A t a x a t i o n  scheme i s  efficient w i t h  r e s p e c t  t-.o i f  
A l l  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  examples  a r e  examples  o f  a c c e p t a b l e  and e f f i -  
c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes. 
The l i t e r a t u r e  on " o p t i m a l  t a x i n g "  ( s e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  [ I - 3 1 )  
h a s  e x t e n s i v e l y  d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  problem o f  s e l e c t i n g  c h a r g e s  such  
t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  t r e a t m e n t  i s  minimized w h i l e  a  g i v e n  w a t e r  
q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d  i s  s a t i s f i e d .  I f  w e  d e f i n e  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
c o s t  E ( q )  a s  z e r o  when t h e  s t a n d a r d  i s  met and i n f i n i t y  when it 
i s  n o t ,  we s e e  t h a t  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  problem i s  reduced  t o  t h e  d e t e r -  
m i n a t i o n  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  scheme. 
F i n a l l y ,  s t a b i l i t y  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  f o l l o w s .  
D e f i n i t i o n  5 (Stability) 
A t a x a t i o n  scheme i s  s t a b l e ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  f i ,  i f  
T h a t  i s ,  we have a  s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  scheme when a l l  s u b s e t s  y of  
N t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  p a r t i e s .  
I f  a  t a x a t i o n  scheme i s  e f f i c i e n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  N, we have 
Therefore, in this case the condition of stability can be modi- 
fied as follows. 
Remark 2 
An efficient taxation scheme is stable with respect to N ,  if 
We now use two of the preceding notions (efficiency and 
stability) to give the following definition. 
Definition 6 ( C o r e )  
The set of the vectors Bu of benefits generated by all the taxa- 
tion schemes which are efficient and stable with respect to 3 is 
called the core of n. 
A simple and visual representation of the core can be given in the 
case n = 2, i.e. when there are only two polluters in the system. 
* * *  
In Figure 5 the three dimensional space of benefits (B0,B1,B2) 
is shown, together with the three planes 
These planes are characterized by the fact that they contain all 
the vectors of benefits generated by efficient taxation schemes. 
More precisely, if an efficient taxation scheme is applied to N 
the corresponding vector of benefits belongs to the last plane, 
while, if it is applied to, for example, { 0 , 1 }  the corresponding 
vector of benefits lies on the intersection of the first plane 
* 
with the plane B2 = 0. 
Figure 5. The space of the benefits and the core (ABCDE). 
It can be noticed from the figure that V({0,1,2}) is greater 
than v({O,I}) and ~({0,2)), which means that in this case the 
characteristic function is convex (see Equation (5)). Moreover, 
* 
the vectors B corresponding to the points of the polyhedron 
ABCDE, are such that 
and t h e r e  a r e  n o  o t h e r  p o i n t s  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
S i n c e  t h e s e  a r e  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  and s t a b i l i t y  it 
means t h a t  t h e  c o r e  i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  convex po lyhedron  ABCDE. 
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  we w i l l  prove  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t  t a x a t i o n  schemes 
g e n e r a t i n g  a l l  t h e  p o i n t s  o f  t h e  po lyhedron  ABCDE ( s e e  P r o p e r t y  
3 below) s o  t h a t  we w i l l  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h e  c o r e  i s  t h e  convex 
po lyhedron  ABCDE. The f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s  w i l l  be used  
l a t e r  on t o  a n a l y z e  some p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s .  The f i r s t  two a r e  v e r y  
s i m p l e  w h i l e  t h e  t h i r d  i s  a  s u i t a b l e  r e f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  an i m p o r t a n t  
r e s u l t  proved by Shap ley  [ 4 ]  . 
P r o p e r t y  1 
A t a x a t i o n  scheme which i s  s t a b l e  and e f f i c i e n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
a i s  a l s o  a c c e p t a b l e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  F. 
Proof 
S t a b i l i t y  and e f f i c i e n c y  imply ( s e e  Remark 2 )  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand from t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  func-  
t i o n  we g e t  
s o  t h a t  E q u a t i o n  ( 9 )  g i v e s  
which means a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  t a x a t i o n  scheme. 
P r o p e r t y  2  
I f  t h e  demand f u n c t i o n s  A; ( - 1  a r e  concave f u n c t i o n s ,  t h e n  a  n e c e s -  
L 
s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  s t a b l e  and 
e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  scheme i s  
Proof 
N e c e s s i t y  
The e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  t a x a t i o n  scheme i m p l i e s  
~ h u s ,  f rom P r o p e r t y  1  we o b t a i n  
which c a n  be t r a n s f e r r e d  i n t o  
v(m) L V ( Y )  
i f  Remark 2 i s  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t .  
S u f f i c i e n c v  
The c o n c a v i t y  of  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  i m p l i e s  ( s e e  Remark 1 )  t h e  e x i s -  
t e n c e  o f  an e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  scheme o f  t h e  k i n d  d e s c r i b e d  i n  
Example 1 .  L e t  u s  s e l e c t  t h e  t a x a t i o n  scheme w i t h  a = 1 ,  i . e .  
N the t a x a t i o n  scheme f o r  which B. = 0  f o r  a l l  p o l l u t e r s  i and 
B: = V I ~ )  . For  t h i s  scheme we kave 
B u t ,  by a s s u m p t i o n ,  V ( R )  > V(y)  +f y  & N (and  t h e r e f o r e  
~ ( f i )  1 V ( y )  +t y  = y w h i l e  f o r  y  = y  we have V ( y )  = 0 )  s o  t h a t  
- 
which is  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes 
0 
( s e e  Remark 2 )  . 
P r o p e r t y  3 
I f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  i s  convex, t h e  co r e  e x i s t s  and i s  
a  convex polyhedron.  Moreover t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  l e x i c o g r a p h i c  t ax a -  
t i o n  schemes ( s e e  Example 3 )  a r e  s t a b l e  (and e f f i c i e n t )  and g e n e r a t e  
a l l  t h e  b e n e f i t s  of t h e  c o r e .  
Proof  
A fundamental  theorem due t o  Shapley 141 s a y s  t h a t ,  i f  t h e  char -  
a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  V(y)  i s  convex t h e  s e t  C of t h e  (n + 1 ) t h  
d imens iona l  v e c t o r s  B = (BO,B1, ..., B ) s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  fo l l o win g  
n  
two c o n d i t i o n s  
and 
i s  a  convex polyhedron c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by (n  + I ) !  v e r t i c e s .  More- 
ove r ,  l e t  o  r e p r e s e n t  one o u t  o f  t h e  (n + l ) !  o r d e r i n g  i + o ( i )  o f  
t h e  components of t h e  ( n  + 1 ) t h  d imens iona l  v e c t o r  B  and d e f i n e  
BO a s  
where 
Then, t h e  p o i n t  B@ i s  o n e  o f  t h e  v e r t i c e s  o f  t h e  s e t  C. I f  we 
compare t h e  p r e c e d i n g  e q u a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  t a x a t i o n  scheme d e f i n e d  
i n  Example 2 w e  u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  t h e  l e x i c o g r a p h i c  t a x a t i o n  schemes 
a r e  s t a b l e  and e f f i c i e n t ,  and t h a t  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  schemes gener -  
a t e  a l l  b e n e f i t s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  C, i .e .  t h e  c o r e  and t h e  Set C  
c o i n c i d e .  o 
PROPERTIES OF THE MODEL 
I n  o r d e r  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s t a b l e  and e f f i c i e n t  
t a x a t i o n  schemes i n  r e g i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  management, it i s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  p o s t u l a t e  some s t r u c t u r a l  p r o p e r t i e s  f o r  t h e  func-  
t i o n s  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h e  u n i t s  we c a l l e d  f i r m s ,  t r e a t m e n t  network 
and env i ronment .  
P r o f i t  F u n c t i o n s  
We assume t h a t  t h e  p r o f i t  f u n c t i o n  D .  ( a )  h a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
p r o p e r t i e s :  
Assumptions (i) and (ii) o n l y  s t a t e  t h a t  no p r o d u c t i o n  i m p l i e s  
no p r o f i t  and t h a t  more p r o d u c t i o n  i m p l i e s  more p r o f i t .  Assump- 
t i o n  (iii), namely t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  m a r g i n a l  p r o f i t  i s  a  de- 
c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of  Q i s  u s u a l l y  s a t i s f i e d  f o r  s u f f i c i e n t l y  i' 
h i g h  v a l u e s  o f  Qi, i . e . ,  f o r  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e  f i r m s .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, s m a l l  f i r m s  a r e  sometimes c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by i n c r e a s i n g  
m a r g i n a l  p r o f i t s  because  o f  t h e  economies o f  s c a l e  i n  t h e  t e c h -  
nology o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  T h i s  means t h a t  t h e  t h e o r y  deve loped  i n  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  can o n l y  be a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  c a s e s  when t h e  f i r m s  
e x p l o i t i n g  t h e  common r e s o u r c e  a r e  s o  l a r g e  t h a t  t h e i r  m a r g i n a l  
p r o f i t  c a n n o t  be  i n c r e a s e d  by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  amount o f  goods 
p roduced .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand p o i n t  ( i i i)  , namely t h a t  t h e  p r o f i t  
f u n c t i o n  Di ( s )  i s  concave ,  c a n n o t  be  r e l a x e d  s i n c e  it i m p l i e s  
t h a t  e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes can be l e v i e d  on Qi ( s e e  Remark 1 ) .  
Trea tment  P l a n t  Cos t  
The c o s t  f u n c t i o n  Ti(Qi ,qi )  o f  a  s i n g l e  t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t  i s  
assumed t o  e x h i b i t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o p e r t i e s  ( [ 1 , 3 , 5  1 ) : 
( a )  Ti (Qi ,q i )  i s  convex w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  q i  
(b) Ti ( Q i  , q i )  i s  convex w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  Q .  
( c )  Ti (Qi ,aQi)  i s  concave w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  Q .  
These p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  a lways  s a t i s f i e d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  t h i r d  one 
which i s  due  t o  t h e  economies o f  s c a l e  a lways p r e s e n t  t o  some 
e x t e n t .  Thus t h e  f u n c t i o n  Ti (Qi ,qi )  i s  n o t  convex ( s e e  p r o p e r t y  
( c ) )  though  i t  i s  convex w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  Qi and q . .  The s h a p e  
o f  t h e  s u r f a c e  T i ( Q . , q i )  i s  i n  f a c t  o f  t h e  k i n d  shown i n  F i g u r e  6 .  
Trea tment  Network C o s t  
L e t  u s  assume t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e  ne twork .  Thus,  a s  we a l r e a d y  s a i d ,  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  t r e a t -  
ment network i s  a  f u n c t i o n  T(Q+,q+)  o f  t h e  t o t a l  i n p u t  Q+ = 1 Qi 
i 
o f  t h e  network and of  i t s  t o t a l  o u t p u t  q +  = q j .  The c o s t  o f  a  
1 
t r e a t m e n t  network w i l l  be assumed t o  s a t i s f y  an i m p o r t a n t  p r o p e r t y  
r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  economies o f  s c a l e  which c a n  be f o r m u l a t e d  a s  
f o l l o w s  : 
f o r  
T h i s  p r o p e r t y  i s  a  n a t u r a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  
economies  o f  s c a l e  o f  t h e  c o s t  o f  a  t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t  ( s e e  p r o p e r t y  
( c )  a b o v e ) .  I n  f a c t  i f  it i s  assumed t h a t  
E q u a t i o n  ( 10)  becomes 
from which it  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  T(Q+,aQ+) i s  concave.  
Moreover,  i f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  network of  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t  
i s  somehow c o n s t r a i n e d ,  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  economies  o f  s c a l e  must 
be  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  a  more g e n e r a l  way, by s u b s t i t u t i n g  Q;,q;,Q;, 
q;,A and 6 i n  E q u a t i o n  ( 1 0 )  w i t h  t h e  v e c t o r s  Q 1 , q ' , Q " , q " , A  and 
6 (A>0,6,0). - 
E n v i r o n m e n t a l  Damage 
The main f e a t u r e  t o  b e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  when d i s c u s s i n g  
t h e  damages p r o d u c e d  by t h e  u s e r s  o f  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e s o u r c e  
i s  t h e  s o  c a l l e d  c o n g e s t i o n  e f f e c t .  At some low l e v e l  o f  u s e  
an  a d d i t i o n a l  u s e  o f  t h e  r e s o u r c e  may p r a c t i c a l l y  g e n e r a t e  no  
s u r p l u s  o f  damage. A  p o i n t  i s  r e a c h e d ,  however ,  where  a n  a d d i -  
t i o n a l  u s e r  w i l l  c a u s e  o t h e r s  t o  h a v e  t o  i n c u r  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t s  
o r  s u f f e r  d i s u t i l i t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c o n g e s t i o n  (see [ 6 ]  f o r  
d e t a i l s ) .  T h i s  p r o p e r t y  c a n  b e  g i v e n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v e r y  g e n e r a l  
f o r m  
where  q ' ,  q "  and  6 a r e  t h r e e  n o n - n e g a t i v e  v e c t o r s  a n d  q "  > q ' .  
E q u a t i o n  ( 1 1 )  i m p l i e s  t h a t  E  i s  convex  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  e a c h  
component  q i  ( q !  = q'! and  6 .  = 0 f o r  a l l  j # i i n  E q u a t i o n  ( 1  1 )  ) . 
I I I 
ANALYSIS OF PARTICULAR CASES 
The t r a d i t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  h a s  been l e g i s -  
l a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s c h a r g e s .  The l a w s  e x i s t i n g  t o d a y  
e i t h e r  s t i p u l a t e  t h e  a l l o w a b l e  amount o f  w a s t e  t h a t  e a c h  t y p e  o f  
f i r m  c a n  d i s c h a r g e  ( e f f l u e n t  s t a n d a r d )  o r  f i x  a  r e q u i r e d  t r e a t -  
ment  e f f i c i e n c y  ( e .  g .  85% b i o l o g i c a l  oxygen demand r emova l  b e f o r e  
d i s c h a r g e ) .  I n  some e n v i r o n m e n t a l  l a w s  it  is  t a c i t l y  assumed 
t h a t  a l l  t h e  d i s c h a r g e s  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  i n d u c e  n e g l i -  
g i b l e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  damage,  w h i l e  o t h e r  l e g i s l a t i o n s  d o  n o t  con-  
s i d e r  E ( q )  t o  b e  z e r o  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  e a c h  p o l l u t e r  i s  a s k e d  t o  
c o m p e n s a t e  t h e  damage i n  m o n e t a r y  t e r m s .  G e n e r a l l y ,  e a c h  p o l l u t e r  
a c t s  by h i m s e l f  a n d  t a k e s  c a r e  o f  h i s  own t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t .  How- 
e v e r ,  a  r e g i o n a l  w a s t e  t r e a t m e n t  s y s t e m  c o u l d  o f t e n  b e  o f  advan-  
t a g e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  economies  o f  s c a l e  and t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  re- 
a l l o c a t i n g  d i s c h a r g e s .  Thus ,  it  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  
c a s e  o f  a  r e g i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  ( t h e  C.A.) wh ich  t a k e s  c a r e  o f  t h e  
t r e a t m e n t  ne twork .  I n  d o i n g  s o  t h e  C.A. e i t h e r  w i l l  a c q u i r e  t h e  
r i g h t s  o f  d i s c h a r g e  owned by t h e  f i r m s  ( i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  e f f l u e n t  
s t a n d a r d )  o r  w i l l  be  o b l i g e d  t o  u s e  a  t r e a t m e n t  network o f  s u f -  
f i c i e n t l y  h i g h  e f f i c i e n c y  ( i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  r e q u i r e d  t r e a t m e n t  
e f f i c i e n c y ) .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s  t a x e s  a r e  l e v i e d  on t h e  p o l l u t a n t  
f l o w  r a t e s  Qi g e n e r a t e d  by e a c h  f i r m .  
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we a n a l y z e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s t a b l e  and 
e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes,  b o t h  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  e f f l u e n t  s t a n -  
d a r d s  and i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  f i x e d  t r e a t m e n t  e f f i c i e n c y .  To g a i n  
i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  a  w e l l - d e s i g n e d  r e g i o n a l  w a s t e  
t r e a t m e n t  network w e  w i l l  make a  comparison between t h e  c a s e  
i n  which t h e  t r e a t m e n t  network i s  u n c o n s t r a i n e d  and t h e  c a s e  i n  
which it must b e  a  c o m p l e t e l y  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  one.  
A  more r e c e n t  approach  t o  w a t e r  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  i s  by e f -  
f l u e n t  c h a r g e s .  The s t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  w i l l  be  deve loped  l a t e r .  
E f f l u e n t  S t a n d a r d s  and Taxes  on Qi 
We assume t h a t  e a c h  f i r m  h a s  a  r i g h t  o f  d i s c h a r g e  q .  and 
t h a t  t h e  C e n t r a l  A u t h o r i t y  i s  t a k i n g  c a r e  o f  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  f a c i l -  
i t i e s .  When no c o n s t r a i n t s  a r e  imposed on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  
network t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  t h e  C.A. i s  
C ( Q )  = min [T ( Q + , q + )  + E ( q )  1 
The l a s t  c o n s t r a i n t  means t h a t  t h e  C.A. can  d i s c h a r g e  up t o  a  
- N 
maximum q+ g i v e n  by t h e  sum of  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  d i s c h a r g e  o f  t h e  
p o l l u t e r s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n  q0 i s  a  f u n c t i o n  
o f  Q + ,  i . e .  
w h i l e  i f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  damage E ( q )  i s  assumed t o  be  z e r o  
0 
t h e  t o t a l  o u t p u t  q +  is  n o t  d e p e n d e n t  upon Q ,  s i n c e  i t  i s  o b v i o u s l y  
g i v e n  by 
When t h e  C e n t r a l  A u t h o r i t y  i s  c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  u s e  a  c o m p l e t e l y  
d i s a g g r e g a t e d  ne twork  we assume t h a t  i t  a l s o  l o s e s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
r e a l l o c a t e  t h e  d i s c h a r g e s  o f  t h e  p o l l u t e r s ,  i . e .  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  
o f  t h e  C.A. i s  
C ( Q )  = min [I T i ( Q i t q i )  - E ( q ) l  
q  N 
s u b j e c t  t o  
I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  v e c t o r  q0 i s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  v e c t o r  Q ( a n d  
n o t  o f  Q , ) ,  w h i l e  i f  E ( q )  = 0  o b v i o u s l y  q: = qi .  
We a n a l y z e  now f o u r  p o s s i b l e  c a s e s  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o r d e r :  
( i) u n c o n s t r a i n e d  n e t w o r k ,  E ( q )  = 0  
(ii) u n c o n s t r a i n e d  n e t w o r k ,  E ( q )  f 0  
(iii) c o m p l e t e l y  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  ne twork ,  E ( q )  = 0  
( i v )  c o m p l e t e l y  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  ne twork ,  E  ( q )  f 0. 
( i )  Under t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  E ( q )  = 0 ,  we c a n  p r o v e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
b a s i c  p r o p e r t y .  
P r o p e r t y  4 
I f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  damage i s  n e g l i g i b l e  a n d  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  
t r e a t m e n t  ne twork  s a t i s f i e s  E q u a t i o n  ( l o ) ,  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t  
e f f i c i e n t  and s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes .  
The p r o o f  o f  t h i s  p r o p e r t y ,  g i v e n  i n  t h e  Appendix ,  c a n  b e  e a s i l y  
m o d i f i e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  show t h a t  i f  t h e  s t r i c t  i n e q u a l i t y  i s  s a t i s -  
f i e d  i n  E q u a t i o n  ( l o ) ,  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n  i n f i n i t y  o f  s t a b l e  
t a x a t i o n  schemes c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by B = 0  ( s e e  segment CD o f  0  
F i g u r e  5 ) .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  t h e  C e n t r a l  A u t h o r i t y  can  c h a r g e  t h e  
f i r m s  o n l y  f o r  t h e  c o s t  o f  t r e a t i n g  t h e  w a s t e  and s t i l l  have 
o p t i o n s  i n  s h a r i n g  t h e  t o t a l  b e n e f i t  among t h e  f i r m s .  
(ii) I f  we assume 
it is  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  p r o v e  t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  i s  
convex and t h e r e f o r e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes can-  
n o t  be  i n f e r r e d  any more by means o f  P r o p e r t y  3. On t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  it c o u l d  b e  shown by means o f  s i m p l e  examples  t h a t  t h e  nec- 
e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  o f  P r o p e r t y  2 c a n  be e i t h e r  s a t i s -  
f i e d  o r  n o t ,  s o  t h a t  we can  have c a s e s  i n  which s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  
schemes e x i s t  and c a s e s  i n  which a l l  t a x a t i o n  schemes a r e  u n s t a b l e .  
B u t ,  even when s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes e x i s t ,  t h e  C.A. i s  more 
c o n s t r a i n e d  t h a n  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  c a s e  ( E ( q )  = 0 ) .  I n  f a c t  we 
w i l l  now prove  t h a t  when t h e  c o n g e s t i o n  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  env i ronment  
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by z e r o  
p r o f i t  o f  t h e  C.A. c a n n o t  b e  s t a b l e .  T h i s  means t h a t  s t a b i l i t y  
can  be  o b t a i n e d  o n l y  a t  t h e  p r i c e  o f  t r a n s f o r m i n g  t h e  C.A. i n t o  
a  p r o f i t  c o r p o r a t i o n .  More p r e c i s e l y ,  w e  p r o v e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
p r o p e r t y .  
When t h e  c o n g e s t i o n  e f f e c t  is  dominant  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  econ- 
omies  o f  s c a l e  ( i n  t h e  s e n s e  s p e c i f i e d  by E q u a t i o n  ( 1 2 )  b e l o w ) ,  
e a c h  p o l l u t e r  d e s i r e s  t o  e x p e l  t h e  o t h e r s  from t h e  s y s t e m ,  u n l e s s  
t h e  C.A. is  t o  some e x t e n t  a  p r o f i t - m a k i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n .  
- 
L e t  u s  d e n o t e  w i t h  q N  t h e  o u t p p t  v e c t o r  of  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  network 
n O N  
s e r v i n g  t h e  s y s t e m  N(q = q  ( Q , ) )  and w i t h  CJ'~' t h e  o u t p u t  v e c t o r  
o f  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  network t h a t  would be  u s e d  i f  t h e  i t h  p o l l u t e r  
were  a l o n e  i n  %he r e g i o n a l  s y s t e m  w i t h  a  p o l l u t a n t  p r o d u c t i o n  
D 0 N 
~ ~ ( q ' ~ '  = q  ( Q i ) ) .  Then t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  c o s t  due 
t o  t h e  economies  o f  s c a l e  is  
w hi l e  
is t h e  i n c r e a s e  of  t h e  envi ronmenta l  damage due t o  t h e  co n g es t i o n  
e f f e c t .  The conges t i on  e f f e c t  i s  dominant w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  
economies of  s c a l e  i f  
Thus P r o p e r t y  5 is e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  fo l l o win g  p r e c i s e  s t a t e m e n t s :  
Equa t ion  ( 12 )  i m p l i e s  t h e  non-ex is tence  of s t a b l e  and e f f i c i e n t  
- 
t a x a t i o n  schemes w i t h  BN = 0 .  
0 
Proof  o f  P r o p e r t y  5 
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  i s  g iv en  by 
Hence, from Equat ion  (1 2)  we o b t a i n  
where 
On t h e  o t h e r  hand i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  t a x a t i o n  scheme which i s  s t a b l e  
and e f f i c i e n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  N we have 
Thus, 
from which the following sequence of expressions can be obtained: 
But Equation (13) implies that the right hand side of the last 
expression is strictly positive so that the property is proved. 
From the proof of this property we can conclude that if we 
consider a sequence of problems in which the environment is more 
and more sensitive to the congestion effect we would obtain cores 
that are smaller and smaller. In Figure 7 a sequence (a) - (d) 
is shown; in (a) and (b) inequality (12) is not satisfied, while 
(c) refers to the limit case in which Equation (12) is satisfied 
with the equality sign. 
(iii) Let us now analyze the implications of constraining the 
C.A. to use a completely disaggregated network of treatment plants. 
For this, consider first the case in which the environmental 
damage is negligible 
and recall that in this case q0 = qi. Then 
1 
- 
V(N) = rnax [I Ai(Qi) - 1 T ~ ( Q ~ . B ~ )  I = 1 max [A. (Q.) - T ~ ( Q ~ , ~ ~ )  I 
Q N N 1 1  N Qi 
and this condition implies that the characteristic function is 
convex. In fact, since V is strictly positive, from Equation (15) i 
we obtain 
which implies that condition (5) is satisfied with the strict 
inequality if i = 0 and with the equal sign if i # 0. Since V 
Figurr 7 .  Smaller rorri; are obta~ned for increahing c-ongest~on cfft~ct  
is convex, Property 3 can be applied and the conclusion is that 
the core exists. The fundamental difference with respect to the 
case of the aggregated network is that we now have only one point 
- - 
in the core with 8: = 0. In fact if 8: = 0 we have 
Hence stability and Equation (15) imply 
which proves the uniqueness of such taxation schemes. This case 
is shown in Figure 8 where the point C = D represents the unique 
Figure 8. The core when E(q) = 0 and a completely disaggregated network is 
usrd. 
p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  C . A .  t o  b e  a  n o n - p r o f i t  c o r p o r a t i o n .  T h i s  
p o i n t  r e q u i r e s  a  s p e c i f i c  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  t h e  b e n e f i t  V(P)  among 
t h e  f i r m s .  I f  a  d i f f e r e n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  d e s i r e d  ( s e e ,  f o r  i n -  
s t a n c e ,  p o i n t  S o f  F i g u r e  8 ) ,  t h i s  can  be done o n l y  by means o f  
an u n s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  scheme. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i f  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  
C . A .  i s  a l lowed  t o  be p o s i t i v e  t h e n  t h e  scope  can be o b t a i n e d  by 
means o f  s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes ( s e e  segment AR o f  F i g u r e  8 ) .  
( i v )  We f i n a l l y  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c a s e  
w i t h  t h e  C . A .  c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  use  a  comple te ly  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  n e t -  
work o f  t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t s .  Again a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a g g r e g a t e d  
ne tworks  we can have c a s e s  i n  which t h e r e  a r e  no s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  
schemes. T h i s  can happen when t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  s u b s e t  x  o f  N such  
t h a t  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  of t h e  damage produced by t h e  s e t  n - x  i s  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h e  n e t  b e n e f i t  
i . e .  when 
where 
- - 
N - q  = ~ O ( Q ~ )  qX = (Q') . 
I n  f a c t  c o n d i t i o n  (16)  i m p l i e s  
N - v ( N )  = w ( N )  - ~ ( q  ) < W ( i )  - E ( q X )  = V ( i )  
which c o n t r a d i c t s  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  ( s e e  P r o p e r t y  2 )  f o r  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  s t a b l e  and e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes. On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand i f  t h e  s i g n  - > h o l d s  i n  Equa t ion  ( 1 6 )  f o r  a l l  
x E N w e  can prove  t h a t  
which i m p l i e s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  c o r e .  The o n l y  d i f f e r e n c e  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  c a s e  of  u n c o n s t r a i n e d  networks ( s e e  p o i n t  
(ii) above) i s  t h e  un iqueness  o f  t h e  s t a b l e  and e f f i c i e n t  t a x a -  
t i o n  scheme which a s s i g n s  a  z e r o  b e n e f i t  t o  t h e  C . A . ,  w h i l e  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  c a s e  (iii) is  t h e  pos- 
s i b i l i t y  o f  n o n - e x i s t e n c e  o f  such p a r t i c u l a r  t a x a t i o n  schemes. 
T h i s  e a s i l y  f o l l o w s  from Equa t ion  (14)  and t h e  c o n d i t i o n  
which c a n  b e  proved w i t h  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  c o n g e s t i o n  
e f f e c t  o f  t h e  environment .  I n  F i g u r e  8 an example is shown w i t h  
v ( N )  = 1 Vi ,  w h i l e  i n  F i g u r e  9 ( n o t i c e  t h a t  v ( N )  < 1 Vi) t h e  
N N 
l o w e s t  p o i n t  o f  t h e  c o r e  ( p o i n t  C : D) i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
which c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  l i m i t  g i v e n  by Equa t ion  ( 1 4 ) .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  comple te  o u r  a n a l y s i s ,  w e  c o u l d  now c o n s i d e r  
t h e  c a s e  i n  which t h e  C e n t r a l  A u t h o r i t y  can r e a l l o c a t e  t h e  r i g h t s  
o f  d i s c h a r g e  even when it i s  f o r c e d  t o  use  a  c o m p l e t e l y  d i s a g -  
g r e g a t e d  network.  The c o s t  o f  t h e  C.A. i s  t h e n  
C  (Q)  = min 11 Ti (Qi , q i )  - E  ( q )  I 
q  N 
Figure 9. The  core when E:(q) f O crttd a corr~pletcly disagregated tlctwork 
is used. 
The a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  can be accomplished i n  a  way s i m i -  
l a r  t o  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  o n e s  and t h e  main r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  t h e  freedom 
t o  r e a l l o c a t e  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  d i s c h a r g e  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  l a r g e r  c o r e s ,  
i . e .  t h e  number o f  e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes i s  g e n e r a l l y  l a r g e r  
t h a n  i n  t h e  c a s e  i n  which t h e  C . A .  c a n n o t  r e a l l o c a t e  t h e  r i g h t s  
o f  d i s c h a r g e .  
F ixed  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  Removal and Taxes on Q .  
T h i s  t i m e  we assume t h a t  t h e  law s t a t e s  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  a  c e r -  
t a i n  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e a c h  f i r m ' s  was te  p r o d u c t i o n  must be  removed, 
i . e .  i f  a  f i r m  produces  Qi t h e n  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  d i s c h a r g e  must 
be q .  < Z Q . .  A s  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  c a s e  A ,  t h e  C e n t r a l  A u t h o r i t y  
1 
t a k i n g  c a r e  o f  t h e  w a s t e  t r e a t m e n t  w i l l  s e l e c t  t h a t  e f f l u e n t  
l o a d  v e c t o r  q0 t h a t  min imizes  h i s  c o s t .  Again q0 i s  i n  g e n e r a l  
a  f u n c t i o n  o f  Q ,  w h i l e  when t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  damage i s  n e g l e c t e d  
0 
we have q+ = EQ+ and q0 = ZQ. r e s p e c t i v e l y  f o r  t h e  c a s e s  o f  ag- i 
g r e g a t e d  and d i s a g g r e g a t e d  t r e a t m e n t  ne tworks .  The p o s s i b l e  
c a s e s  we c o n s i d e r  a r e  t h e  same a s  b e f o r e .  S i n c e  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
c a n  be  deve loped  i n  e x a c t l y  t h e  same way, we do n o t  g i v e  any 
p roof  and we o n l y  summarize t h e  main r e s u l t s .  
( i '  ) I n  c a s e  ( i )  t h e  c o r e  a lways  e x i s t s  and h a s  a n  
N i n f i n i t y  o f  p o i n t s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by B~ = 0 ( a s  
i n  F i g u r e  5 ) .  
( i i ' )  I n  c a s e  (ii) we c a n  have i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  a l l  t a x a t i o n  
schemes and ,  i n  any c a s e ,  t h e  number o f  s t a b l e  and 
e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes is  lower  t h a n  i n  an 
e q u i v a l e n t  s y s t e m  w i t h  E ( q )  = 0 .  A l l  t y p e s  o f  
c o r e s  shown i n  F i g u r e  7  can  be o b t a i n e d  depend ing  
upon t h e  r e l a t i v e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e  c o n g e s t i o n  
e f f e c t  and o f  t h e  economies o f  s c a l e .  
( i i i ' )  I n  c a s e  (iii) t h e  c o r e  a lways  e x i s t s  b u t  it i s  o f  
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  form r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  F i g u r e  7c .  
i I n  c a s e  ( i v )  s t a b l e  and e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes 
c a n  be  o b t a i n e d  ( i f  p o s s i b l e )  o n l y  by t r a n s f o r m i n g  
t h e  C . A .  i n t o  a  p r o f i t  c o r p o r a t i o n .  
E f f l u e n t  Charges  
L e t  u s  suppose  t h a t  t h e  w a s t e  p r o d u c t i o n s  {Oil o f  t h e  
f i r m s  a r e  g i v e n  and assume t h a t  e a c h  f i r m  t r e a t s  i t s  own w a s t e .  
Thus,  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  C . A .  i s  s i m p l y  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  environmen- 
t a l  damage E ( q )  and t h e  c h a r g e  is  s e t  on t h e  e f f l u e n t s  q  The 
i '  
demand f u n c t i o n  A .  ( q .  ) i s  t h e r e f o r e  g i v e n  by 
1 1  
and it is  convex s i n c e  T.  (Qi ,q i )  i s  convex ( s e e  p r o p e r t y  ( a )  
1 
o f  t h e  c o s t  of a  t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t ) .  T h i s  f a c t  i m p l i e s  ( s e e  
Remark 1 )  t h a t  e f f i c i e n t  schemes c a n  be g e n e r a t e d .  
Again t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  c a n n o t  be proved t o  be  
convex and indeed  by means o f  s i m p l e  examples  it c o u l d  be shown 
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  c a s e s  i n  which a l l  e f f i c i e n t  t a x a t i o n  schemes a r e  
u n s t a b l e .  More p r e c i s e l y  t h e  c o r e  e x i s t s  o n l y  i f  t h e  p r o f i t s  o f  
t h e  f i r m s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  h i g h  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d -  
i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  damages. I n  any c a s e  t h e  c o r e ,  i f  it e x i s t s ,  
is  of  t h e  k i n d  shown i n  F i g u r e  9 .  Again t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  is  t h a t  
it i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  have s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes w i t h  t h e  C.A. 
b e i n g  a  n o n - p r o f i t  c o r p o r a t i o n .  ( S t a b i l i t y  h a s  i t s  p r i c e ! )  
The a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  c a s e  i n  which t h e  w a s t e  p r o d u c t i o n  Qi 
of  t h e  f i r m s  has  n o t  y e t  been d e c i d e d  on and a  s t a n d a r d  on t h e  
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  removal i s  imposed can  a l s o  be c a r r i e d  o u t .  P r o o f s  
v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  ones  we have a l r e a d y  g i v e n  a r e  n o t  r e p o r t e d  
h e r e  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  b r e v i t y  and t h e  main r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  s t a b l e  
t a x a t i o n  schemes c a n n o t  be  found i f  t h e  p r o f i t s  o f  t h e  f i r m s  a r e  
n o t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  h i g h .  Moreover a l l  s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes a r e  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by some p o s i t i v e  b e n e f i t  f o r  t h e  C . A .  
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS 
Very s i m p l e  n o t i o n s  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  games have been  used  
i n  t h i s  p a p e r  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  problems o f  s t a b i l i t y  and e f f i c i e n c y  
o f  t a x a t i o n  schemes i n  r e g i o n a l  e n v i r o n n - e n t a l  management. A l -  
though t h e  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  p a p e r  a p p l i e s  t o  
any k i n d  o f  p o l l u t i o n  problem ( w a t e r ,  a i r ,  s o l i d ) ,  r e f e r e n c e  i s  
made t o  t h e  problem of  w a t e r  p o l l u t i o n  i n  a  r i v e r  b a s i n  and t h r e e  
p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s e s  o f  problems a r e  a n a l y z e d  i n  d e t a i l .  
The f i r s t  c l a s s  i s  concerned w i t h  t h e  c a s e  i n  which e f f l u e n t  
s t a n d a r d s  a r e  imposed by law on each  f i r m .  A r e g i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  
i s  t a k i n g  c a r e  o f  an a reawide  w a s t e w a t e r  t r e a t m e n t  sys tem,  t h e  
c o s t s  o f  which a r e  a p p o r t i o n e d  among u s e r s  by means o f  c h a r g e s  
l e v i e d  on t h e  r e s i d u a l s  produced by e a c h  f i r m .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  
c h a r g i n g  r u l e s  which a l l o w  t h e  r e g i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  a t  l e a s t  t o  
c o v e r  i t s  c o s t  under  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  t h e r e  is  no i n c e n t i v e  
f o r  any group o f  d i s c h a r g e r s  t o  wi thdraw from t h e  r e g i o n a l  s y s t e m  
( s t a b i l i t y )  is  a n a l y z e d .  The r o l e  p l a y e d  by t h e  damage t o  t h e  
env i ronment  and by t h e  economics o f  s c a l e  i n  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  pro-  
c e s s  a r e  p o i n t e d  o u t .  I f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  damage i s  n e g l i g i b l e ,  
s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes can  a lways  be found ,  w h i l e ,  i f  t h e  w a s t e  
is  t r e a t e d  i n  a  c o m p l e t e l y  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  way ( i . e . ,  f i r m  by f i r m ) ,  
t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes t o  e x i s t  a r e  s t r o n g -  
l y  l i m i t e d .  
The second  c l a s s  o f  problems i s  concerned  w i t h  t h e  c a s e  i n  
which a  s t a n d a r d  on t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  removal  is  imposed by law 
t o  e a c h  f i r m  ( c r u d e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  U.S. law ( b e s t  p r a c t i -  
c a l  t r e a t m e n t ) ) .  Again t h e  t a x e s  a r e  on t h e  w a s t e  p r o d u c t i o n  
and r e s u l t s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e  a r e  found a s  f a r  
a s  t h e  r o l e s  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  damage and t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  
network a r e  concerned .  
The t h i r d  c l a s s  o f  problems d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  c a s e  o f  e f f l u e n t  
c h a r g e s .  I t  is  shown t h a t  s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes can i n  g e n e r a l  
e x i s t  o n l y  i f  t h e  f i r m s  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by s u f f i c i e n t l y  h i g h  
p r o f  i ts .  
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e  p a p e r  shows t h a t  i f  t h e  damages t o  t h e  
env i ronment  a r e  n o t  n e g l i g i b l e  and i f  t h e s e  damages must be r e -  
funded  by t h e  u s e r s  o f  t h e  r e s o u r c e  it  i s  v e r y  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  e f -  
f i c i e n t  and s t a b l e  t a x a t i o n  schemes c a n  be found i f  t h e  r e g i o n a l  
a u t h o r i t y  a c t s  a s  a  n o n - p r o f i t  c o r p o r a t i o n .  These r e s u l t s  a l s o  
s t a t e  t h a t  i f  t h e  damages t o  t h e  env i ronment  a r e  n e g l e c t e d ,  o r ,  
i n  o t h e r  words ,  i f  t h e  t o t a l  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  f i r m s  i n s t e a d  of  
t h e  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t  i s  maximized, t h e n  e f f i c i e n c y  and s t a b i l i t y  
a r e  e a s i l y  o b t a i n e d .  T h i s  is  i n d e e d ,  what happened i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  
o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  development  o f  t h e  l a s t  c e n t u r y  i n  a l m o s t  a l l  
c o u n t r i e s :  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of  t h e  f i r m s  h a s  been v e r y  h i g h  and 
t h e r e  h a s  been no f r i c t i o n  o r  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  t h e  u s e  of  t h e  s e l f -  
purification capacity of the environment. Nevertheless, these 
two nice attributes have been obtained at a price which is de- 
finitively too high: namely the fact that damages to society 
are neglected. The increased public awareness nowadays makes 
this solution no longer feasible. In this respect the paper 
indicates an alternative solution, since stability and efficiency 
can also be obtained by letting the regional authority get a 
profit by the sale of emission rights. The higher the environ- 
mental congestion the greater must be this profit. If ethical 
and political attitudes are against this kind of solution there 
is no way to maximize the social benefit without generating fric- 
tions among the polluters. 
APPENDIX 
The proof  t e c h n i c a l l y  c o n s i s t s  i n  showing t h a t  t h e  charac-  
t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  V i s  convex,  s i n c e  t h e n  P r o p e r t y  3 can  be 
a p p l i e d .  The proof  i s  ana logous  t o  t h e  one g iven  by Soreson  e t  
a l .  [ 7 ]  f o r  p r o v i n g  t h e  c o n v e x i t y  o f  V under  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s .  
Cons ider  two s e t s  A C 8 C and a  f i r m  k E f i  - 8. For s i m -  
p l i c i t y  o f  n o t a t i o n  l e t  us  d e n o t e  
and r e c a l l  t h a t  
where 
Cons ider  t h e  two f o l l o w i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  c a s e s  
Case ( i )  
Equat ion  ( 10)  i m p l i e s  
a s  it can be v e r i f i e d  l e t t i n g  
Adding to both sides of Equation (A.1) 
8 A -A 
V(A) - I Ai(Qi) + T(Q+,q+) 
A 
and reordering, we obtain 
B 
> v ( ~ i  - j A ~ ( Q ~ )  +T(I QY,~:) . (A. 2 )  
A A 
8 Adding and subtracting 1 A. (ai) to the left hand side H of the 
B 1  
last inequality we get 
Noting that 
we have 
V(B) - V(8) 2 H . 
On the other hand, since 
(A. 3) 
w e  o b t a i n  
where t h e  l e f t  hand s i d e  i s  t h e  r i g h t  hand s i d e  o f  Equa t ion  ( A .  2 )  . 
Hence from (A.3) and (A.4) it f o l l o w s  
Case (ii) 
I n  t h i s  c a se  Equa t ion  ( 1 0 )  i m p l i e s  
a s  can e a s i l y  be  proved.  
Adding 
and 
( n o t i c e  t h a t  t h e  two e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  e q u a l )  t o  t h e  l e f t  and r i g h t  
hand s i d e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y  of  Equa t ion  (A.51, and r e o r d e r i n g ,  we g e t  
F i n a l l y ,  s i n c e  
we obtain 
V ( B  U { k ) )  - V ( B )  2 V ( A  u {k)) - V ( A )  . 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
A .  ( x .  ) = demand f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  i t h  p o l l u t e r .  
1 1  
A ( x Y )  = a g g r e g a t e d  demand f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h e  s u b s e t  y o f  N .  
Y 
Bi(x i )  = Ai(xi)  - Ci(xi)  = b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  i t h  p o l l u t e r .  
B O ( x )  = 1 C .  ( x . )  = b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  C.A. 
N l l  
* 
i = o p t i m a l  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  i t h  p o l l u t e r .  
g y  = o p t i m a l  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  s u b s e t  y  o f  N  i n  t h e  c a s e  i n  
which o n l y  t h e  p o l l u t e r s  o f  y  a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  
- 
sys tem.  
Ci (x i )  = t a x  ( c h a r g e )  l e v i e d  on t h e  i t h  p o l l u t e r .  
C ( x )  = c o s t  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  C . A .  
C (xY) = c o s t  s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  C.A.  i n  t h e  c a s e  i n  which o n l y  
Y 
t h e  p o l l u t e r s  o f  t h e  s e t  y a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  sys tem.  
D .  ( Q .  ) = p r o f i t  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  i t h  f i r m .  
1 1  
E ( q )  = e n v i r o n m e n t a l  damage. 
N  = t h e  s e t  o f  p o l l u t e r s .  
- 
N  = t h e  s e t  o f  p o l l u t e r s  and t h e  C.A.  
Qi = mass f l o w  r a t e  of p o l l u t a n t  produced by t h e  i t h  f i r m .  
Q = a  f i x e d  l e v e l  of w a s t e  p r o d u c t i o n .  
Q+ = 1 Qi = t o t a l  w a s t e  p r o d u c t i o n .  n 
c1 = i n p u t  v e c t o r  o f  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  ne twork .  
j = mass f low r a t e  o f  p o l l u t a n t  d i s c h a r g e d  by t h e  j t h  
e f f l u e n t  o f  t h e  network o f  t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t s .  
q+ = q j  = t o t a l  d i s c h a r g e .  
- 
I 
q i  = r i g h t  o f  d i s c h a r g e  o f  t h e  i t h  f i r m .  
- 
q  + = 1 qi = r i g h t  o f  d i s c h a r g e  o f  t h e  C . A .  N  
9  = d i s c h a r g e  v e c t o r  o f  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  network.  
0 
q  (Q+) = d i s c h a r g e  v e c t o r  of t h e  l e a s t  c o s t l y  t r e a t m e n t  n e t -  
work which t r e a t s  t h e  i n p u t  Q+ w i t h  a  t o t a l  d i s c h a r g e  




= q (Q+) = optimal discharge vector of the set i. 
T (Q,q) = cost of the treatment network. 
V(y) = characteristic function = maximum net benefit when 
only the polluters of y are present in the system. 
'i = V((0,i)) = maximum net benefit when only the ith 
firm is present in the system. 
X i = emission of the ith polluter. 
* 
x = optimal emission of the ith polluter. i 
x = emission vector. 
x = efficient emission vector for the y subset of polluters. 
- 
X 8 Y = subsets of R. 
- 
Y = y U (0) = the subset y and the C.A. 
Y 
-
= y - (0) = the subset of polluters in y. 
w (i) = an ordering of the polluters. 
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